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Abstract 
By applying the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, this paper assesses the extent to which 
immigration has been securitised at the EU level after the 2015 Paris attacks. It is doing so by not only 
examining the presence of the securitisation actors and the security speech acts, as is commonly done 
in the current securitisation literature, but also by analysing from a legal point of view, two emergency 
measures implemented by the EU to deal with the migration crisis. Most importantly, this paper 
investigates the response of the European public to the securitisation moves and highlights that this 
aspect of the Copenhagen School’s analytical framework has been not only undertheorised but also 
understudied.  
Keywords: Audience Acceptance, European Union, Migration, Securitisation, Security, Terrorism  
“I cannot bear and will not accept an amalgamation of the topics of refugees 
and terrorism in the wake of the atrocious attacks in Paris. The cynics who 
exploit the suffering of Paris have not understood that those who perpetrated 
the attacks are precisely those whom the refugees are trying to flee.” 
Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 21/11/2015 
Introduction 
Drawing on the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, this paper examines the 
extent to which the EU refugee crisis has been securitised at the EU level. The literature 
that addressed this issue before 2015 claimed that immigration has not been 
securitised. Yet, in 2015, Europe dealt with one of the largest influx of refugees ever 
recorded in the European history and with the unprecedented surge of terrorist 
incidents on the European continent. The series of terrorist attacks, commencing in 
Paris in November 2015, and the attempts of certain influential political figures across 
Europe to connect these tragedies with the refugee crisis facilitated the securitisation 
of migration. That is one of the reasons that triggered the conduct of this study. The 
second reason is the identification of a gap in the securitisation literature. Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde, in their seminal study Security: a new framework for analysis 
(1998) argue that securitisation occurs when a securitising actor claims that a 
particular referent object is existentially threatened. On the basis of this allegation, the 
securitising actor defends his right to utilise extraordinary measures for guaranteeing 
the survival of the referent object. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, three 
Stivas, ANZJES 11(1) 
 
42 
elements are necessary for a securitisation to be considered successful: 1) the 
designation of an existential threat to a referent object, 2) the adoption of emergency 
(and unlawful) measures, and 3) the acceptance by the audience. 1  Despite Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde stressing the importance of the third element, audience 
acceptance, most of the securitisation scholars who employ the Copenhagen School of 
Security Studies analytical framework focus only on the ‘securitisers’ and the security 
rhetoric. Almost no one investigates the extent of the audience’s acquiescence in the 
securitisation moves.  
To establish whether the recent European refugee crisis has been successfully 
securitised this paper firstly establishes the links between migration, terrorism, and 
security. Then it turns to exploring the existence of the three securitisation components 
at the EU level. Who are the securitisation actors at the EU level? What sort of rhetoric 
do they utilise to transform the refugee crisis from a political to a security issue? What 
measures are taken to materialise the securitisation moves? Who is the target 
audience? Has this audience explicitly or implicitly approved the securitisation 
rhetoric and the adoption of the emergency and potentially unlawful measures? To 
provide answers to these questions, this paper explores the lawfulness of two of the 
most prominent responses by the EU for dealing with the refugee crisis. Subsequently, 
it assesses the response of the target audience to the securitisation moves. Considering 
that securitisation actors are usually political figures, it is inferred that their target 
audience is the European public. Therefore, surveys that investigate the ‘feelings’ of the 
Union’s public about immigrants and the refugee crisis are investigated. The outcomes 
of these surveys shed light on whether migration has been securitised at the EU level 
after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. 
Securitisation of Migration 
A Migration-Terrorism-Security Nexus 
In the ‘West’, immigrants are often presented as threatening the economy, the 
‘Western lifestyle’, and public order.2 Politicians across Europe exploit the public’s 
anxiety of getting ‘drowned’ by the ‘waves’ of immigrants to weaponise immigration on 
the political agenda and approach it as a security issue.3 The majority of European 
citizens seem to agree with European politicians.4 The public considers that the sharp 
rise in the numbers of asylum seekers arrivals in Europe is directly related to the rise 
of crime, the fragmentation of social solidarity and collective identity, the poor 
performance of the labour market, low levels of education, and inter-ethnic tension.5  
What is more, immigration has turned into a “burning existential question”, due to its 
relationship with the “free movement of terrorists”.6 Regularly, politicians, the mass 
                                                      
1 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security a New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998), 24- 26. 
2 Georgios Karyotis and Dimitris Skleparis, “Resistance to the Criminalization of Migration” in The Immigrant 
Other: Lived Experiences in a Transnational World, eds. Rich Furman, Greg Lamphear and Douglas Epps (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016), 266. 
3 Ioan Bogdan, Maria Claudia Mera, and Florin Ioan Oroian, “Determinations and Conditionality in the Context of 
the Migration in the European Union,” Eurolimes 18, (2014):117. 
4 Elena-Ana Nechita and Nicolaie Iancu, “Debates and Controversies on European Migration Policies,” Law 
Review 8, no. 2 (December 2018): 4. 
5 Ibid. 






media and the EU public frame the refugees as responsible for the recent terrorist 
attacks. They claim that potential terrorists may easily pretend to be asylum seekers 
and in that way reach the heart of Europe to execute their deadly plans.7 The likelihood 
of terrorists utilising the refugees’ influx as a ‘trojan horse’ to enter Europe provides 
politicians with a pretext for the adoption of stricter measures of migration control8 or 
even for the securitisation of migration. To assess the extent to which the refugee crisis 
has been succesfully securitised at the EU level, the Copenhagen School of Security 
Studies’ analytical framework seems to be the most appropriate.  
B Securitisation Theory 
The first researchers who attempted to comprehensively explain and define 
securitisation were scholars from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies 
(Copenhagen School). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) argued that “we are 
witnessing a case of securitization” when “by means of an argument about the priority 
of an existential threat the securitizing actor [manages] to break free of procedures or 
rules he should otherwise be bound by”. 9  To further facilitate the study of a 
securitisation process, the Copenhagen School’s theorists outlined three components 
(or steps) of a successful securitisation: (1) existential threats, (2) emergency action, 
and (3) the effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.10 By inter-unit 
relations they meant the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience. 
“…only once an actor has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate 
need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we 
identify a case of securitization”, the Copenhagen School’s scholars claimed. 11 
Although the three components of a successful securitisation seem to be of equal 
importance, the literature on securitisation focuses mainly on studying the designation 
of existential threats. Usually, the securitising actors designate existential threats to a 
referent object by issuing a statement, making a speech or giving an interview. The 
designations of existential threats are also called security speech acts.12  
Anyone could be a securitising actor and articulate security speech acts. But not 
everybody’s statements could activate the adoption of extraordinary measures. The 
political elites, due to the wide coverage of their statements by the mass media and 
because of their ability to transform declarations into actual measures are usually 
placed in the position of the securitising actor.13 However, no securitisation could be 
successfully performed without the political elites having managed to persuade their 
target audience. Securitisation is the ‘outcome’ of a process through which agents 
(political elites) and audiences (the public) share the same knowledge about the alleged 
significance of a threat and a common ‘understanding’ about the urgency for the 
deployment of all ‘available resources’ to prevent this threat from being further 
developed. 14  The acceptance of the security speech act by the audience is “a 
                                                      
7 Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International Security 3, 
no. 1, (Summer 2006): 175. 
8 Christina Boswell, “Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 590. 
9 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, 25. 
10 Ibid. 26. 
11 Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” Journal of International Relations and 
Development 9, (2006): 55. 
12 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 33 and 40. 
13 Ibid. 40. 
14 George Karyotis, “Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives and Implications,” International 
Political Sociology 6, (2012): 391. 
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precondition for the legitimization of measures that go beyond the daily routines, the 
elevation of the issue in the agenda, and the violation of the rules”.15 The securitisation 
process is dependent on an “empowering audience” that legitimises and reproduces 
the actors’ securitising frame.16 It is the audience that is the ultimate judge of the 
securitising move.17  
Although the role of the audience has been emphasised by numerous scholars it has 
been examined insufficiently in the current literature. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
warned that “one danger of phrases securitization and speech act is that too much focus 
can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing 
those who are the audience and judge of the act”.18 Obviously, securitisation theory 
places undue emphasis on the discourse of the political elites but does not “consider 
the popular discourse in which securitization moves are embedded”.19 The existing 
literature mainly employs discourse analysis to assess securitisation. However, 
discourse analysis can only point towards the influence of a securitising actor without 
being able to gauge the impact of the security language on public threat perceptions.20 
Despite the emphasis on the importance of the public, the audience acceptance 
element has remained unaddressed and understudied. 
A proper study of the successful securitisation of a particular topic should highlight 
and assess the role of the audience. The recent refugee crisis and the reaction of the 
‘European audience’ to the security speech acts at the European Union level seem to 
be the most appropriate case study.  
Methodology 
This study investigates the events that occurred between November 2015, when a 
series of terrorist attacks occurred in Paris, and December 2016. The reason this study 
focuses on this particular timeframe is twofold. First, until the Paris’ attacks, officials 
across Europe and the European public expressed empathy towards the asylum 
seekers. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the feelings of compassion changed. 
Immigration became a major cause of insecurity. Second, most of the studies 
investigating securitisation of migration in Europe were conducted before 2015. A 
detailed assessment of the securitisation of immigration at the EU level after the Paris’ 
attacks would fill this temporal gap in the literature. In terms of data gathering and 
analysis, qualitative as well as quantitative methods of research are utilised. The first 
assesses the security speech acts and examines the securitisation measures while the 
latter investigates public surveys.  
To come to a conclusion whether immigration has been securitised at the EU level, this 
study takes a pioneering approach by inspecting all components of the securitisation 
process: (1) designation of an existential threat, (2) adoption of emergency action(s), 
                                                      
15 Çiğdem H. Benam, “Emergence of a “Big Brother” in Europe: Border Control and Securitization of Migration,” 
Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 194. 
16 Giuseppe Campesi, “The Arab Spring and the Crisis of the European Border Regime: Manufacturing Emergency 
in the Lampedusa Crisis,” EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2011/59, (2011): 3. 
17 Scott D. Watson, “Framing’ the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40, no. 2 (2011): 298. 
18 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, 41. 
19 Robert W. Glover, “The Theorist and the Practitioner: Linking the Securitization of Migration to Activist 
Counter-Narratives,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2011): 94. 
20 Georgios Karyotis and Stratos Patrikios, “Religion, Securitization and Anti-immigration Attitudes: The Case of 





and most importantly, (3) acceptance by the target audience. Drawing on a scientific 
framework that utilises variables to measure, establish and/or define a case, the 
securitisation of immigration is the dependent variable. The independent variables are 
the three components outlined above. As illustrated in Table 1, if this study concludes 
that the EU officials present immigration as a security threat to the EU, that they 
couple their security speech acts with emergency and rules-violating measures and that 
the target audience accepts the security speech acts and the adopted measures, then 
we are dealing with a successful securitisation of immigration at the EU level. But if it 
is found that securitisation occurs despite the absence of one of the independent 
variables, it means that the absent variable does not play a significant role in the 
securitisation process. Securitisation is possible without it. 
With regards to the level of analysis, this study focuses exclusively on the EU level. 
Securitising actors are actors who due to their social standing, influence and power, 
and public recognition may convey messages broadly, immediately and efficiently. At 
the EU level, some actors hold more power than others to designate existential threats. 
The actors most capable of securitising migration are the leaders of the EU’s most 
prominent institutions. These are the European Council and the European 
Commission (Commission). The first, even though it does not adopt legally binding 
decisions, is qualified to designate the direction that the EU should take regarding 
particular issues. The latter, with its ability to draft laws and its oversight function, may 
propose the adoption of emergency measures and oversee their implementation. The 
statements and press releases of these EU institutions enjoy broad coverage by the 
mass media. Words, phrases, and sentences uttered by EU officials portraying 
migration as an existential threat constitute indications of potential securitisation 
attempts and are thoroughly analysed. The lawfulness of two of the most controversial 
measures that the European Union adopted to deal with the refugee crisis is 
investigated as well. 
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Source: Author’s own construction 
To assess the audience acceptance component of securitisation, this study firstly 
defines the target audience and secondly investigates the feelings of this audience 
towards immigrants and refugees. It does so in order to gauge the audience’s potential 
response to the security speech acts and to the emergency measures. Assuming that 
the target audience is the European public and considering the vast size of the public 
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and its linguistic, cultural and Inter-State differences, this study examines surveys that 
pose to the public questions about migration and that are publicly available.  
Designations of Existential Threats 
A European Council 
Among the EU institutions, the European Council is the one that defines the political 
direction and priorities and sets the EU's policy agenda. Through its ‘Conclusions’, it 
highlights issues of concern and calls for actions. These ‘Conclusions’ are examined 
thoroughly to identify whether the refugee crisis has been presented as an existential 
threat.  
From November 2015 onwards, migration held a prominent place among the issues 
discussed at the European Council summits. Regular references to “migration flows”, 
“illegal migration”, and “migration crisis” are observed in almost all the ‘Conclusions’. 
However, the sentences that contain such words are very carefully phrased. They put 
emphasis on the safety of the migrants and respect of their human rights. The sections 
of the ‘Conclusions’ dedicated to internal security and terrorism are also carefully 
articulated to avoid any accidental references to migration therein. However, 
migration is directly mentioned in the parts of the ‘Conclusions’ referring to the 
necessity for the revision of the Schengen Border Code and the urgency for the 
operationalisation of the European Border Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). The migration 
sections of the ‘Conclusions’ highlight the need to reinforce the control of the EU’s 
external borders to meet both migration and security objectives.21 The presence of 
migration and security within the same sentence demonstrates that for the European 
Council the two issues are interrelated. Yet, although migration has been framed as a 
security-relevant issue, it has not been presented as an existential threat to the Union. 
The European Council often reiterated the need for a comprehensive strategy 
“consistent with the right to seek asylum, fundamental rights, and international 
obligations”.22  
B The President of the European Council  
Frequently, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, associated migration 
with the security of the Union. The “urgency of the situation” and the requirement for 
“immediate additional operation measures” were emphasised in his official 
statements.23  In one instance, he combined the words “migration”, “security” and 
“terrorism” within the same sentence. “The fact that millions of Europeans feel 
insecure is real. People […] express fears over migration, terrorism […]” Tusk 
underlined after a summit in Bratislava.24 Obviously, the combination of migration, 
                                                      
21 “European Council Meeting Conclusions,” Press Release 28 June 2016, accessed 29 June 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/28-euco-conclusions/. 
22  “European Council Meeting Conclusions,” Press Release 15 October 2015, accessed 29 June 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21693/euco-conclusions-15102015.pdf. 
23 “Invitation letter from President Donald Tusk to the EU heads of state or government before Malta summit,” 
Press Release 31 January 2017, accessed 29 June 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/01/31-tusk-invitation-letter-malta/; “Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the informal summit in 
Malta,” Press Release 3 February 2017, accessed 29 June 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/02/03-tusk-press-remarks-malta/. 
24 “Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the Bratislava Summit,” Press Release 16 September 2016, accessed 






terrorism and security in the same sentence does not directly associate these words 
with each other. However, when the leading ‘voice’ of the European Union claims that 
migration is linked to Europeans feeling insecure, then the foundation for the 
securitisation of immigration could be set. Admitting that an issue constitutes a threat 
to a referent object is the first securitisation step. The next would be to announce the 
need to resort to extraordinary means and procedures to tackle the threat.  
Tusk’s inclination to securitise migration is even more apparent when he speaks to the 
mass media. In March 2016 he advised potential migrants to avoid coming to Europe.25 
Despite his references to the commitments of the Union to the protection of human 
rights, he proposed more than once that it would be acceptable and legitimate to detain 
irregular migrants for up to 18 months for identification checks.26 In January 2016, he 
stated that the EU had “no more than two months to get things under control” 
regarding the migration crisis.27 Otherwise, “we will face grave consequences such as 
the collapse of Schengen”.28 In another of his statements, he claimed that the future of 
Europe “is being threatened” by radical, populist, nationalistic sentiment that utilises 
the migration influx to increase its influence.29 
The European Council seems to avoid connecting terrorism with migration and 
security in its official documents. However, the President of the European Council, in 
his official and unofficial statements, did not hold back from correlating migration with 
threats to the Union's security and calling for the adoption of urgent and forceful 
measures. Could these actions qualify as security speech acts? On the basis of the 
Copenhagen School’s theorem, for the identification of a security speech act, it is the 
designation of existential threats and the adoption of extraordinary measures that 
matters. It is true that Tusk presented migration as a threat to the operationalisation 
of a core element of the EU integration, the Schengen system. Yet, the purpose of this 
statement was not to call for the adoption of extraordinary measures for dealing with 
the refugee crisis. Tusk merely desired to terminate the (lawful) emergency measures 
introduced by several Member States (re-initiation of border controls on a temporary 
basis) that threatened the existence of the Schengen area.  
To conclude, despite the frequent references to migration and insecurity, the European 
Council seems to have avoided securitising migration. In no case has the European 
Council associated the refugee influx with the series of terrorist attacks across the 
European continent.   
C European Commission 
Following the terrorist attacks of 2015, the most powerful official of the Commission, 
the President, Jean-Claude Juncker, attempted to eliminate any potential link between 
the refugee crisis and terrorism. “I will not accept an amalgamation of the topics of 
                                                      
25 Jennifer Rankin, “Do not come to Europe, Donald Tusk warns economic migrants,” The Guardian, March 3, 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/donald-tusk-economic-migrants-do-not-come-to-
europe; Maïa de la Baume, “Donald Tusk says EU migration crisis is ‘never-ending,” Politico, April 13, 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-says-eu-migration-crisis-is-never-ending/. 
26 Eric Maurice, “Tusk: ‘Wave of migrants too big not to be stopped,” EUobserver, December 3, 2015, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/131363. 
27 Eric Maurice, “Tusk sets EU two-month deadline on migrant crisis,” EUobserver, January 19, 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/131905 accessed 29 June 2017. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Graig Winneker, “Tusk: EU needs ‘tough’ migration policies,” Politico, April 22, 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-eu-needs-tough-migration-policies/. 
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refugees and terrorism in the wake of the attacks in Paris. […] Those who perpetrated 
the attacks are precisely whom the refugees are trying to flee” he warned.30 In the wake 
of the deadly truck-attack in Berlin in December 2016, Juncker reiterated that the best 
way to fight terror was with “openness” and stressed that Europe should continue to 
receive migrants. 31  Likewise, Frans Timmermans, the first Vice President of the 
Commission, who coordinated a new policy on migration as one of the ten Commission 
priorities, backed Juncker’s remarks about the necessity for maintaining an open 
borders policy.32 Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Commission’s senior migration official, 
attempted to diffuse the anti-immigration sentiment by reminding Europeans that 
“anyone resisting the arrival of migrants should remember that Europe is an ageing 
continent and needs to attract new people, as well as develop strategies to send home 
those who enter illegally”. 33  Obviously, with their official statements, the key EU 
Commission officials highlighted the need to dissociate the refugee crisis from the 
terrorist attacks. The official communications of the Commission followed the same 
line. A detailed examination of the Commission’s documents revealed this institution’s 
human rights approach to the refugee crisis.34  
To sum up, the EU’s officials and institutions that had the power to designate the 
refugee crisis as a security threat and to propose, adopt and implement extraordinary 
measures at the EU level claimed that there was no connection between the refugees 
and the terrorist attacks. Yet, the same officials and institutions supported two 
particular EU emergency actions the operationalisation and conclusion of which have 
raised legal concerns. The following section investigates whether the establishment of 
the European Border Coast Guard (EBCG) and the conclusion of the EU-Turkey 
Statement violated any substantive and procedural EU rules and whether they 
constituted emergency, extraordinary (and unlawful) measures. 
The Legality of the EU Emergency Measures  
A The European Border and Coast Guard Agency  
In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the Commission urged the establishment of the 
EBCG Agency. The EU hoped that establishment of the agency would enable the EU to 
manage migration more efficiently, improve the internal security of the EU, and 
safeguard the principle of free movement of persons.35 To do so, for the first time in 
the history of the Union, the border control of the Member States would be entrusted 
                                                      
30 “Paris attacks: the European Union stands united,” Press Release 16 November 2015, accessed 29 June 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_AC-16-1970_en.htm. 
31 Virginia Hale, “EU chief: Borders must stay open despite deadly terror attacks,” Breibart, December 24, 2016, 
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/12/24/eu-chief-borders-must-stay-open/. 
32 Will Worley, “Six out of 10 migrants to Europe come for ‘economic reasons’ and are not refugees, EU Vice 
President Frans Timmermans says,” Independent, January 27, 2016, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/six-out-of-10-migrants-to-europe-come-for-economic-
reasons-and-are-not-refugees-eu-vice-president-a6836306.html. 
33 Tamsin Rutter, “EU risks being shaken apart by refugee crisis, warns Brussels,” The Guardian, December 4, 
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/dec/04/european-union-values-shaken-
refugee-crisis. 
34 “Back to Schengen: Commission proposes Roadmap for restoring fully functioning Schengen system,” Press 
Release 4 March 2016, accessed 29 June 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-585_en.htm; 
“Commission recommends extending temporary internal border controls for a limited period of three months,” 
Press Release 25 October 2016, accessed 29 June 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
3501_en.htm. 
35 “A European Border and Coast Guard to protect Europe's External Borders,” Press Release 15 December 2015, 





(under certain circumstances) to an EU agency. For the Member States, the control of 
their external borders is a sensitive matter directly related to their sovereignty. It is 
very unlikely that any EU Member State would permit an EU agency to intervene 
within its borders without its consent as provided by the EBCG Regulation. Concerns, 
therefore, were raised regarding the legality of the EBCG Regulation and its 
compliance with all procedural rules during the deliberations for its adoption.36 The 
short period between the proposal by the Commission and the announcement of the 
EBCG agency’s official launch raises even more concerns. A period of legislative 
deliberation of less than twelve months has been rarely observed in the EU’s 
policymaking. By investigating the form of the legislative procedure that was followed 
in the adoption of the EBCG Regulation, its legal basis, as well as the text of the 
Regulation itself, I expect to shed light on these concerns. 
The EBCG Regulation was adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. The 
European Parliament (EP), directly elected by the EU citizens, and the Council of the 
EU (Council) that comprises representatives of the EU Member States have an equal 
say in this procedure. The Commission submits a legislative proposal to the EP and the 
Council, who must agree on the text via a series of readings for it to become EU law. 
For the adoption of the EBCG Regulation, the procedural rules seem to have been 
followed correctly. The EP and the Council consulted each other as usual and made use 
of their legitimate right to amend the Commission’s proposal. The short timeframe it 
took for the adoption of the Regulation also does not seem unlawful. The European 
Council and the Commission emphasised the importance of dealing with the migration 
crisis immediately and efficiently. Admittedly, it is unusual for the EU to adopt 
Regulations in such a short timeframe (nine months). This, however, does not mean 
that a Regulation agreed in such a short time is unlawful. Yet, to come to a conclusion 
on the lawfulness of the Regulation, it is essential to examine its legal basis.  
The Regulation is based on Article 77(2) (b) and (d) and Article 79 (2) (c) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).37 According to these provisions the 
EP and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure shall 
adopt measures concerning the checks to which persons crossing external borders are 
subject, any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated 
management system for external borders, and measures in the areas of illegal 
migration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of those 
residing without authorisation. As noted above, the ordinary legislative procedure was 
followed as prescribed by the legal basis. However, a closer look at the text of the 
Regulation reveals some potential legal pitfalls. Article 1 of the Regulation includes in 
its ‘subject matter’ the assurance of a high level of internal security. Considering that 
EU internal security is covered by a different Treaty Chapter than the border policies, 
migration, and asylum part, and given that the legal basis of this Regulation covers 
merely the prevention and fight against illegal crossing and irregular migration, it 
seems like a legal basis issue could emerge.38 It seems like the adoption of measures 
for addressing internal security that are embedded in a legal instrument made for the 
protection of the external borders goes beyond the ‘subject matter’ of the Regulation. 
                                                      
36 Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog, “A European Border and Coast Guard: What's in a name?” CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 88 (2016): 2; Francesca Ferraro and Emilio De Capitani, “The new 
European Border and Coast Guard: yet another “half way” EU reform?” ERA Forum 17, no. 3 (2016):1. 
37 “Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008/C 115/01,” European 
Union, 13 December 2007, accessed 29 June 2017, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2008%3A115%3ATOC. 
38 Ferraro and Capitani, “The New European Border,” 12. 
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This indicates it may be just a matter of time until the Court of Justice of the EU will 
be called to adjudicate on this ‘mission creep’. Until that happens, the EBCG 
Regulation may be considered as not having violated any rules. Yet, to tackle the 
perceived threat of the refugee crisis, the EU did not only propose and implement the 
EBCG but also endorsed and concluded a legally and politically controversial deal with 
Turkey.  
B EU-Turkey Statement 
Turkish and EU officials had been working on a draft plan to deal with refugees since 
2015.39 This resulted in the conclusion of a ‘refugee deal’ between the EU and Turkey. 
That ‘deal’ provided for the return of individuals arriving irregularly by boat in Greece 
to Turkey, in exchange for increased EU resettlement of Syrians from Turkey, large 
sums of aid to Turkey and the abolition of EU visa restrictions for Turkish nationals.40 
The ‘deal’ was considered by many to be successful. Following its conclusion, the 
irregular arrivals decreased by 97%. 41  Yet, the ‘deal’ provoked serious concerns 
regarding its legality. Most of these concerns focus on the name of the ‘deal’.42  
Article 218 of the TFEU outlines the procedure that the EU should follow when 
negotiating and concluding agreements with third countries. Based on Article 
218(6)(a)(v) TFEU, such agreements may only be concluded by the Council after 
obtaining the consent of the EP. In the case of the EU-Turkey Statement (Statement), 
the EP’s consent was neither requested nor provided. To avoid the time consuming and 
potential negation with the EP, the Council used the term ‘statement’ to present its 
agreement with Turkey. Procedurally therefore, the ‘Statement’ seems to be 
questionable.  
Usually, a ‘Statement’ does not have any legal impact,43 is not legally binding and does 
not require the approval from either the EP or the National Parliaments.44 Moreover, 
the fact that the vague term ‘will’ instead of the stronger ‘shall’ or ‘should’ is used 
throughout the text of the ‘Statement’ indicates the desire of its drafters to avoid 
bestowing it with legal enforceability. Usually, agreements under international law 
utilise the terms ‘shall’ and ‘should’ in their texts to outline obligations.45 In the EU-
Turkey Statement, both the text and the context contain elements of an international 
agreement. Commitments for both parties emerge from the points agreed. Both parties 
to the ‘Statement’ therefore intended to bind themselves.46 As such, the ‘Statement’ was 
not merely a simple announcement but a legally binding agreement. Thus, by avoiding 
                                                      
39 Ike Toygür and Melih Özsöz, “Stormy months on the Aegean: the refugee deal and its impact on EU-Turkey 
relations,” Real Instituto Elcano, March 15, 2016, 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elc
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40 Zaid Hydari, “Understanding the EU-Turkey Deal,” Huffington Post, November 4, 2016,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zaid-hydari/understanding-the-eu-turk_b_9661472.html. 
41 “Back to Schengen: Commission recommends phasing out of temporary border controls over next six months,” 
Press Release 2 May 2017, accessed 29 June 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1146_en.htm. 
42 Mark Provera, “The EU-Turkey Deal: Analysis and Considerations,” Working Paper, Brussels: Jesuit Refugee 
Service Europe, 2016, accessed 29 June 2017, https://jrseurope.org/assets/Publications/File-
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requesting the consent of the EP before agreeing with Turkey, the EU violated 
procedural rules as outlined in Article 218 of the TFEU.  
From a Copenhagen School’s securitisation theorem perspective, the first element of a 
successful securitisation, the security speech act, seems to be missing whilst the 
presence of the second element, the adoption of extraordinary and potentially unlawful 
measures, is debateable. If an argument were made that these measures were unlawful 
and that the audience responded positively, then we would deal with the case of a ‘silent 
securitisation’. This happens when the securitising actors adopt extraordinary 
measures without having designated an issue as existential threat and without having 
been confronted with any substantial resistance by the audience. 
Audience Acceptance 
To determine whether the audience accepted and endorsed the extraordinary 
measures at the EU level, the target audience has to be determined. Then, the response 
of that audience has to be investigated.  
With regards to the audience’s identity, EU officials, when making public statements, 
usually address them to the European public. This happens because the Heads of States 
participating in the European Council, the ministers representing their countries in the 
Council and the Members of the EP, directly or indirectly, draw their legitimacy from 
and are accountable to the European public. It would be impossible to implement 
extraordinary measures if the European public did not share the same anxieties 
regarding the refugee crisis. If the public resisted the adoption of the proposed 
measures, issues of democratic legitimacy would be raised. The most accurate 
instrument to gauge the ‘feelings’ of the European public with regards to the refugee 
crisis would be analysis of European Parliament elections, by ascertaining the 
proportion of the European public that voted in favour of political parties that based 
their election campaigns on anti-immigration rhetoric. Unfortunately, no EP elections 
occurred within the time frame examined in this study. The last EP elections took place 
in 2014 and the next ones are expected to be conducted in 2019. Therefore, this study 
chiefly consults the Eurobarometer surveys to estimate the (potential) response of the 
public to the measures taken at the EU level to tackle the immigration challenge. The 
findings of the Pew Research Centre surveys are also taken into account. 
Eurobarometer and Pew Research Centre perform surveys relevant to migration in 
general and to the refugee crisis in particular.  
A Eurobarometer 
Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys conducted on behalf of the 
European Commission. These surveys address a wide variety of issues. For the present 
study, the study of the Standard Eurobarometer, which is conducted twice annually, is 
more relevant. Although Eurobarometer does not directly address the migration-
terrorism-security nexus, a series of relevant questions could add value to the findings 
of this study. One of these questions investigates the feelings of the EU citizens towards 
immigrants who come from outside the European Union. As demonstrated in Figure 
1, surveys conducted around November 2015 found that 59% of the European public 
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shared negative feelings about immigration coming from outside the Union.47 At the 
same time, immigration in general (58%) and terrorism (25%) were the main concerns 
of Europeans.48 What is noteworthy is that immigration as a major concern rose by 
20% since spring 2015. Fear of terrorism also increased by 8%. Spring 2016 found the 
concerns about immigration decreased by 10% (48%) while terrorism as a topic of 
concern, in the aftermath of the Brussels bombings, had risen by 14% (39%) from 
autumn 2015.49  This positioning had not changed several months later. Forty-five 
percent considered immigration as the most important issue faced by the EU while 
terrorism followed at 32%.50  The negativity regarding immigration of people from 
outside the EU remained stable (58% in spring 2016 and 56% in autumn 2016).  
Figure 1. Concerns and feelings of the European Public 
  
Source: Author’s own compilation of Eurobarometer surveys 
 
A special survey conducted by the European Commission in March 2015 could be also 
relevant for the purposes of this study although it was performed before the Paris 
attacks. The Special Eurobarometer 2015 investigated the attitudes of the European 
public towards security. Terrorism was seen as the most important security challenge 
(49%) with 92% of Europeans considering it as an essential internal security threat.51 
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Immigration, and in particular irregular immigration, was viewed as one of the most 
crucial security challenges by only 19% of respondents.52  
Although the Eurobarometer surveys do not directly ask the interviewees’ opinions 
about the measures taken at the EU level to deal with the refugee crisis, these surveys 
could provide an indication whether the European public would support the adopted 
measures.  
The asylum seekers in their entirety are non-EU nationals. A public of which 58% to 
59% appears to be sceptical towards immigrants from outside the EU is very likely to 
support any measures that would curb the numbers of third-country nationals present 
in the EU. Moreover, a public of which more than the 50% considers immigration as 
the most important issue faced by the EU is also very likely to accept the measures 
taken by the EU even when such measures are potentially unlawful. Nineteen percent 
of the European public considered immigration as the most crucial security challenge 
in March 2015, before one million asylum seekers crossed the EU borders, and before 
the asylum seekers were blamed for the series of terrorist attacks across Europe. The 
findings of the Special Eurobarometer 2015 would be substantially different if the 
survey had been conducted one year later. The findings of the Pew Research Centre 
survey of September 2016 confirm these thoughts.  
B Pew Research Centre 
The Pew Research Centre (PRC) conducted surveys that, although it did not cover all 
of the EU member states, showed to a large extent the perceptions of Europeans about 
immigration. The PRC surveys are particularly relevant to this study due to the 
specificity of the questions. A survey published in September 2016 found that 59% of 
Europeans across ten Member States were concerned that the influx of refugees would 
increase the likelihood of terrorism and 50% voiced concern that refugees were a 
burden to their countries.53 Regarding the connection between the refugee crisis and 
insecurity, 50.6% of Europeans from the ten Member States believed that a large 
number of refugees leaving Iraq and Syria constituted a significant threat to their 
country.54   
Apparently, the refugee influx and terrorism constituted the major concerns of the 
European public. A high proportion of European citizens saw refugees as potential 
terrorists. Almost six out of ten Europeans feared that refugees were related to the 
terrorist attacks. A slight majority of the EU public (50.6%) perceived the asylum 
seekers as significant threats.  
The findings of the Eurobarometer and the PRC surveys demonstrate that immigration 
and terrorism constitute the primary concerns of the European public. The majority of 
this public considers refugees as a potential terrorist threat and as a burden to their 
country. Taking into account the high degree of negativity, scepticism and fear of 
Europeans towards immigrants and refugees in particular, it is safe to conclude that 
the European public would accept any emergency and illegitimate measures taken by 
the Union to deal with the crisis.  
                                                      
52 Ibid. 
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To sum up, even though no acts or officially unlawful security measures have been 
detected at the EU level, if one takes into consideration the negative predisposition of 
the majority of the EU public towards immigration, it is possible to conclude that the 
adoption and implementation of any potential securitisation measures would be an 
easy task for any securitising actor at the EU level. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study, by employing the Copenhagen School’s analytical framework assessed the 
extent to which immigration at the EU level has been succesfully securitised after the 
terrorist attacks in Paris. Apart from merely examining the existence of security speech 
acts and the lawfulness of the emergency measures as is usually performed by the 
current securitisation literature, this study investigated the actual or potential 
response of the target audience to the securitisation moves. The outcomes of this 
investigation suggest that even after the terrorist attacks across Europe, migration has 
not been succesfuly securitised at the EU level.   
Despite the fact that the European Council and the Commission, as well as their most 
prominent leaders, have repeatedly alarmed their audience, the European public, by 
invoking the ‘dangers’ inherent in the immigration crisis, they never presented the 
refugee crisis as an existential threat to the EU. Two of the emergency measures that 
were employed by the EU, the EBCG Regulation and the EU-Turkey ‘Statement’, were 
examined from a legal point of view. It was found that both measures were 
procedurally atypical and potentially unlawful. Yet, until a court officially declares 
these measures unlawful, they will be considered legitimate and will not fall within the 
meaning of emergency and illegitimate measures as defined by the theorists of the 
Copenhagen School. Further, the investigation of the ‘beliefs’ of the EU public about 
migration revealed that its majority is negatively predisposed towards immigration 
from outside the EU and suggested that this negative predisposition would render a 
potential securitisation attempt successful.  
This study has also highlighted that all components of a succesful securitisation should 
be studied by scholars employing the analytical framework of Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde (1998). The audience acceptance element is equally important to the security 
speech acts and the emergency measures. As such, it should not be left aside by future 
securitisation studies. However, not only the study but also the theorisation of the 
audience acceptance component is absent from the current literature. A more detailed 
analysis and theorisation of that component would add value to the Copenhagen 
School’s analytical framework and would foster a better understanding of 
securitisations not only of migration but also of other non-traditional security issues.  
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